

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

THE UNIVERSITY  
OF MICHIGAN

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COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Monday, 18 March 1963, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Lij Mikael IMRU

(Ethiopia)

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. A. de MELO FRANCO  
Mr. J. MACHADO LOPES  
Mr. R. L. ASSUMPCAO de ARAUJO  
Mr. J. FRANK da COSTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV  
Mr. G. GUELEV  
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV  
Mr. V. IZMIRLIEV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON  
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E. L. M. BURNS  
Mr. S. F. RAE  
Mr. A. E. GOTTLIEB  
Mr. R. M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. K. KURKA  
Mr. A. MIKULIN  
Mr. J. BLAZIK

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU  
Ato M. HAMID  
Ato M. GHEBEYEHU

India:

Mr. A. S. LALL  
Mr. A. S. MEHTA  
Mr. S. B. DESHKAR

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI  
Mr. A. CAVAGLIERI  
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI  
Mr. P. TOZZOLI

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO

Miss E. AGUIRRE

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. M. T. MBU

Mr. L. C. N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. N. ECOBESCU

Mr. O. NEDA

Mr. S. SERBANESCU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Baron C. H. von PLATEN

Mr. E. CORNELL

Union of SovietSocialist Republics:

Mr. S. K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN

Mr. I. G. USACHEV

Mr. P. F. SHAKHOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. S. AHMED

Mr. M. KASSEM

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON  
Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN  
Mr. D.N. BRINSON  
Mr. R.C. BEETHAM

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE  
Mr. D.E. MARK  
Mr. V. BAKER  
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of  
the Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy Special Representative  
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. M.A. VELLODI

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the one hundred and tenth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria)(translation from French): Today I intend to speak on the cessation of nuclear tests. The purpose of the remarks that I propose to make is not to present a comprehensive picture of the situation, but simply to clarify certain aspects of the positions taken on this important problem.

In their statements in the Committee, representatives of the Western nuclear Powers have solemnly declared that they are ready to do everything they can to reach agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. Thus at the meeting of 20 February the United States representative, Mr. Foster, said:

"... I wish quite simply but earnestly to reaffirm the desire of the United States for an effective nuclear test ban treaty." (ENDC/PV.100, p.5)

This statement by the United States representative was repeated at the meeting of 6 March by Mr. Stelle, who asserted that "we have long since made the political decision that we wanted a nuclear test ban agreement." (ENDC/PV.105, p.26)

We must, however, point out that these assertions that the United States wish for an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests do not appear to have sufficiently influenced the attitude adopted by the United States Government. On the contrary, its actions and political decisions on various international problems are flagrantly at variance with the official statements of its representatives.

At his press conference on 21 February 1963 the President of the United States said: "Well, in my judgement, the major argument for the test ban treaty is the limiting effect it might have on proliferation." He emphasized that, if we failed in our efforts to conclude a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests, the only consequence would be an increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons, which might enhance the risk of outbreak of a nuclear conflict.

We fully agree that one of the main objectives of the conclusion of a treaty on the cessation of nuclear tests is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. It should, however, be noted that at the same press conference the President of the

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United States defended the United States plan for the creation of a multinational NATO force "despite all legislative restrictions". But the setting-up of such a multilateral force would not only increase the danger of a nuclear war and intensify the arms race, but would also have the immediate effect of spreading nuclear weapons among countries which do not yet possess them. However much the United States leaders may assert that the multilateral or multinational force — call it what you will — is designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to prevent other countries, in particular Western Germany, from developing their own nuclear weapons, such assertions can convince no one against the existing facts.

The States which are asking for the creation of a multilateral or multinational force are interested precisely in obtaining nuclear weapons and participating in their control. That is the real reason for their support of that multinational nuclear force. It is, of course, possible that the idea of the United States leaders is that the multinational force will enable them to retain control over countries taking part in it because the United States reserves exclusive control over nuclear weapons.

But the events of yesterday and today have shown us that countries aspiring to participation in the control of nuclear weapons, like the Federal Republic of Germany, can neither deceive themselves nor be deceived about their aspirations. Besides, it would be childish to believe that an organization of the so-called multinational nuclear force could be devised which would both satisfy Western Germany's ambition to obtain control over nuclear weapons, and deny it this control by "organizational" subterfuges. Such propositions are mutually exclusive. In fact, this has been recognized by the United States leaders themselves, for they are already contemplating changes in the McMahon Act to enable them to satisfy the claims of the European Powers, and first and foremost of Western Germany, to control over nuclear weapons. Those are also the conclusions of competent United States circles. In its leading article of 16 March, speaking of the multinational nuclear force, the New York Times wrote:

(continued in English)

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"The British already possess and the French are developing nuclear warheads of their own. But the main contribution will have to come from the United States through Congressional revision of the McMahon Act, in order to permit the United States to share nuclear arms control with its allies."

(continued in French)

With regard to nuclear weapons, therefore, all that remains to be done, in order to be able to proceed to the effective formation of the multinational force is to satisfy the requests of the other allies of the United States, headed by Western Germany. We are provided with a proof of that by the United States press itself, which reports that, after Mr. Merchant's talks at Bonn, it was decided that Western Germany should contribute about 40 per cent of the personnel and 35 per cent of the cost of the multilateral force. In other words, the crucial question repeatedly raised by the Western press in recent days — "Whose finger is on the trigger?" — appears, despite all the declarations made in this Committee, to have been settled in favour of the participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in the final decision.

In these circumstance it would be difficult to make public opinion believe that it is possible to work for the cessation of tests of nuclear weapons and against their proliferation while at the same time adopting measures of which the essence is the proliferation of those very nuclear weapons. And yet it is this inconsistency that the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers are trying to persuade us to accept.

In his thoughtful speech of 15 March the representative of Mexico showed most convincingly that one cannot adopt measures contrary to the aims pursued by the Committee and at the same time claim that one is working to achieve those aims. We must not lose sight of reality. Mr. Padilla Nervo said:

"This reality does not depend on us but is determined by the policies of governments, especially those of the great Powers, and it is a reality which unfortunately points in a direction away from general and complete disarmament.

"Rearmament plans continue to be elaborated and improved. Some of these extend beyond the period considered necessary to effect general and complete

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disarmament in all its stages. Military budgets are still increasing, nuclear weapon tests continue, and mutual distrust grows stronger. All these are factors working against the higher objectives assigned to this Conference ..."

(ENDC/PV.109, p.12)

Later the representative of Mexico added:

"Two divergent objectives cannot be followed at the same time. International events are the result, not of spontaneous generation, but rather of the will or conduct of those who rule ..." (ibid., p.13)

By their expressed determination to organize the NATO multilateral nuclear force, the United States leaders are working for the proliferation of nuclear weapons; and this is in direct conflict with the efforts of those who work for a nuclear test ban.

Another very disquieting fact which reveals the intentions of certain United States circles is the continuation of nuclear tests. This fact cannot be reconciled with the negotiations for a test ban. In his speech of 6 March the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, emphasized that continuing nuclear tests "inevitably add considerably to our difficulties and even make our negotiations somewhat unreal". (ENDC/PV.105, p.10). What is the good of trying to convince us by solemn declarations that the Western Powers are in favour of a cessation of nuclear tests when at the same time they are not only continuing to experiment with new nuclear weapons but are also openly proclaiming their intention to continue these tests without interruption?

Numerous representatives have voiced their anxiety about the continuation of the tests in the United States and about the effect that attitude might have on our negotiations. That attitude not only makes our negotiations unreal, but even threatens to make their success impossible. In this connexion we must not forget the warning given by Mr. Lall, representative of India, in his statement of 20 February, in which he said:

"We all know that if once tests start they lead to other tests ..."

(ENDC/PV.100, p.19)

At the same time he addressed a fervent appeal to the United States Government to stop tests. The only reply was a fresh series of underground nuclear tests by the United States.



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Are we to understand from that attitude that the United States wishes to show that it does not feel obliged and does not intend to take any notice of the wishes expressed by members of the Committee, by the peoples of the whole world, and in the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly urging that all nuclear tests should cease from 1 January 1963 (A/RES/1762(XVII); ENDC/63)? It will be recalled that the Soviet Union not only concurred in this decision of the General Assembly and declared that it would abstain from conducting nuclear tests if the other nuclear Powers did the same, but has so far not carried out any further nuclear tests.

Why does the United States defy world opinion and the General Assembly resolution? On this point we are given an indication by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk, who, speaking in the Senate Foreign Affairs Commission, said — according to Reuters and the Associated Press —: "The free world" — that is to say, the Western Powers, which like to use this name — "has the power and the will to maintain its present nuclear superiority". That declaration throws much light on the position adopted by the United States towards the cessation of nuclear tests.

It is such attitudes and such declarations which certainly led the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, to say:

"The quest for the ultimate weapon and for permanent nuclear superiority is false and illusory, and the chief danger of trifling with falsehood is that one may end by believing in it." (ENDC/PV.109, p. 24)

The search for an illusory superiority in nuclear weapons while negotiations are being carried on for the cessation of tests not only renders the negotiations unreal but makes them look like a sinister game played by the Western Powers. While declaring that they would like to achieve a cessation of nuclear tests — declarations intended to allay the world's fears — they continue their tests and the nuclear armament race, thus paving the way for a frightful catastrophe.

In these circumstances it would be idle to believe that an agreement can be reached on the cessation of nuclear tests; for what the Western Powers desire is not the cessation of nuclear tests and the nuclear armaments race; in spite of

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all their statements of good intentions, it is on the contrary the continuation of tests and the stepping up of the nuclear armaments race that they are trying to impose and firmly establish for an indefinite period. That at least is the conclusion which naturally follows from all this, to judge by their acts and not their words. This has also been pointed out by certain well-informed circles in the United States. Thus the well-known columnist, Mr. Walter Lippmann, writes in this connexion in the New York Herald Tribune of 13 March the following, which has already been quoted here:

"The most vocal critics at the moment in this country may say they want a foolproof treaty. What they really want is not to stop testing."

This attitude adopted by the United States and other Western nuclear Powers cannot fail to have repercussions on our Conference's work. The Western nuclear Powers, and in particular the United States, are seeking ways and means — while endeavouring to represent themselves to the world as desiring to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests — of dragging out the discussions indefinitely, and so rendering the conclusion of an agreement on a test ban impossible. The method they have adopted to achieve this consists in bogging down the negotiations in a mire of technical and secondary questions. We have already heard a Western delegation list here twenty-three questions of detail which it proposed that the Committee should examine (ENDC/PV.103, p.6). Others have added to the list and have gone still further in order to divert our attention to questions which would only result in multiplying the difficulties standing in our Conference's way.

To realize this it is sufficient to refer to one of the questions dealt with in the "highly technical" statement made by the United States representative at the meeting of 13 March (ENDC/PV.108, pp. 5 et seq.). This may give some idea of the way in which the Western Powers are striving to raise new difficulties around questions on which the nuclear Powers could easily come to terms once the principal problems had been settled. Explaining the United States point of view on the composition of inspection teams, the United States representative gave the impression that he had forgotten that the United States delegation had already expressed an opinion on this question previously. He expressed the view that nationals of the nuclear Powers should occupy certain important technical posts on these inspection teams, and said:

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"Teams which inspected events in the Soviet Union would be ... composed of fourteen United States-United Kingdom technical experts, with the remainder of the team composed of nationals who were experts from States not members of NATO or the Warsaw Pact." (ENDC/PV.108, p.8)

But the Soviet Union had already pointed out long ago that, in order to ensure compliance with a treaty on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, there was no need to resort to on-site inspection and that it would be sufficient to rely on the national seismic systems. It has also been shown that, in the present state of relations between the great Powers and the lack of confidence that exists among them, the inspections asked for by the Western Powers would lead to increased tension. The general staffs of certain countries might be tempted to take advantage of these inspections and incursions into the territories of other countries to glean information which they considered necessary to complete their knowledge of the military situation and defence preparedness of another country.

It is interesting to note in this connexion that, at the very time when the Soviet Union was opposing all on-site inspections on the ground that they were useless and might give rise to fresh difficulties among States, the representatives of the Western nuclear Powers made statements and gave numerous assurances to the Soviet Union that there was no danger in letting inspection teams enter Soviet territory, because they would be composed of international civil servants recruited among nationals of neutral — I repeat, neutral — countries. In fact, in his statement of 31 August 1962 the United States representative, Mr. Dean, commenting on the draft of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom (ENDC/58), said:

"Furthermore, the Governments of NATO would have nothing whatsoever to do with inspecting the Soviet Union's territory under the draft comprehensive test ban treaty proposed by the United Kingdom and the United States. To say otherwise, I submit, would be a reflection on the dedication of international civil servants who serve so faithfully and so objectively on many international bodies, and who would serve similarly on the proposed international scientific commission." (ENDC/PV.77, p.41)

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In his turn the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Godber, supporting Mr. Dean's view, stated on 5 September 1962:

"In any case, the whole Soviet argument does not seem to be justified, because those visiting international neutral technicians whom we are now proposing as members of inspection teams would travel about the Soviet Union in Soviet transport under the closest observation by Soviet technicians." (ENDC/PV.80, p.18)

We have dwelt for a moment on this question merely to show what difficulties and what controversies our negotiations would encounter if we embarked on the discussion of technical questions before coming to terms on the principal points. The representatives of the Western Powers would be capable of re-opening the discussion on all the points on which agreement had already been reached and on which they had already expressed their views. No decision has been taken by the Conference to engage in preliminary discussions on technical questions; but the representatives of the Western Powers are not only trying to draw up lists of innumerable technical items but are already endeavouring to go back on the decisions taken on some of these issues in the past. It is not difficult to imagine the gusto with which they would plunge the Conference into fresh technical difficulties if a discussion of such details were unfortunately to be decided upon before agreement had been reached on the main issues.

That is why it is necessary --- as we have already pointed out in the past --- to come to an agreement on the principal issues first that is to say, in the present case, to come to an agreement on the number of inspections and of automatic seismic stations, and only then to discuss technical modalities and how to carry them out. This is the only method of procedure which can ensure the success of our work and lead us to our goal.

Another example of the difficulties and absurdities in which we might find ourselves involved in consequence of the attempts of the Western Powers to bog down the Conference in discussions of technical details is provided by the statement of the representative of Canada on 13 March. In an attempt to institute a technical discussion, Mr. Burns tried (ENDC/PV.108, pp. 21 et seq.) to define our problems by

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so-called mathematical formulae. He expressed the probability of discovering a violation of the provisions of the treaty in terms of an empirical formula in which the different parameters were arbitrarily chosen to satisfy the needs of the Western cause. They were at the same time arbitrarily linked together so as to engage the Conference in a discussion of matters of detail.

If we were to define the different parameters according to the preferences of each delegation --- and each delegation could certainly show its preferences in an arbitrary definition of parameters, as the attitude of the Western representatives and the Canadian delegation's definition have demonstrated --- we should certainly become involved in a discussion, to the great satisfaction of certain circles in the Western countries interested in the continuation of tests and of the nuclear arms race. Such a discussion would certainly have a starting-point, but its conclusion might well be a nuclear catastrophe. In other words, the Western Powers could continue indefinitely a discussion of each parameter of all the formulae they propose or might propose or invent, and of every imaginable detail.

However, the important point, now that the Soviet Union has accepted two or three on-site inspections in spite of the possibilities offered by national systems, is to hasten to reach an agreement on the Soviet compromise proposals concerning on-site inspections and automatic seismic stations. All the other questions and parameters can easily be settled afterwards by common consent, provided of course that the Western Powers desire and are willing to achieve the cessation of tests.

What is required now is not a discussion of parameters or details or technical questions --- in which the Western Powers excel, especially when they use erroneous data, as they did for four years during the Conference on the cessation of nuclear tests. What we need now is a political decision by them to accept the compromise proposal put forward by the Soviet Union, a proposal which would give them perfect security in regard to the strict observance of any agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests. It is now for the Western Powers alone to take this decision. It is on them that the eyes of the whole world and of all the peoples are focused. These are waiting for a reply to this question --- an effective reply and not empty speeches --- do the Western Powers want an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests? Have they

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decided to conclude such an agreement, or do they wish to disappoint the hopes of humanity by continuing to hinder the work of the Committee with futile discussions of technical questions, parameters and details, which can have only one effect -- the continuation of nuclear tests and of the nuclear armaments race?

The time has come to accept responsibilities and to take the necessary political decision in order to solve the problem of tests. The Soviet Government took a political decision by accepting the suggestions of the Western Powers on the question of control and of the number of inspections. It is now for the Western Powers to take such a decision. The delegation of the Bulgarian Peoples' Republic expresses the hope that the Governments of the Western Powers will at last decide to take the necessary political decisions to accept the Soviet Union's compromise proposals while the present favourable situation lasts. Only by taking the appropriate political decisions will it be possible to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests, and thus to create favourable conditions for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): Today my delegation proposes once again to address an earnest appeal to the nuclear Powers on the all-important issue of the nuclear test ban. Until the issue of a test ban is finally settled, it will continue to hang over our heads like the sword of Damocles. This issue of a test ban has been the subject of many appeals from humanists, and especially from anxious mothers, all over the world. The reason for their genuine concern is not hard to find. They are probably alarmed, as obviously I am, by the findings of the United Nations Scientific Committee of 1962 on the effects of atomic radiation (A/5216).

That high-powered Committee of scientific repute reported that one result of nuclear tests conducted up to 1961 would be that, of the babies born alive each year, at least 3,000 who would have been healthy would be born suffering from genetic defects. Those alarming facts are well known to the nuclear Powers. It is ascertainable from the present stage of our negotiations that we are indeed very close to reaching agreement. One is compelled to ask: what, then, is preventing a final

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agreement from being reached? Without pretending to be the devil's advocate, I would say that we can very easily reach agreement the moment the two camps stop playing the roles of Jekyll and Hyde. Never before in the history of our Conference have the two sides come so close to reaching agreement on a test ban treaty as now. Indications are that there is evidence of a desire, and the circumstances are propitious for reaching agreement. Only a few outside the precincts of our conference room would bother about the numbers of obligatory on-site inspections which now appear to be a major bone, or one of the major bones, of contention.

However ingenious the nuclear Powers might be in the presentation of their own versions of the case, I must say candidly that what we want today is agreement on a test ban and not persuasive submissions. They may succeed in convincing the marines of the wisdom of their case; but let it be known that sailors will not believe them. The proof to us now that the nuclear Powers sincerely believe in ending all nuclear tests will be their compromising over their remaining differences. It is inconceivable that the controversy which has arisen over the numbers and modalities of on-site inspection might yet rob us of a test ban treaty during this current session. It is inconceivable, I say, because my delegation regards the remaining differences as infinitesimal.

The more one tries to appreciate the logic of the present controversy, the more one finds oneself confounded. The comparison which the representative of the United Arab Republic made (ENDC/PV.99, pp. 16, 17) concerning which came first, the chicken or the egg, may be apposite to the controversy over the numbers and modalities of on-site inspection. But if one takes this sane view, one cannot escape from finding oneself in the delicate predicament -- of which the former United States representative told us in one of his interventions in December (ENDC/PV.91, p.12) -- in which the Red Queen in Alice in Wonderland found herself when she demanded, "First the verdict, and then the evidence", because the evidence confused her.

It is, of course, logical that the parties to any treaty should know what the treaty is all about. Thus one might say that to enter into a treaty on a test ban without adequate safeguards might well be tantamount to signing a nudum pactum.

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Our Mexican colleague, in his very interesting statement on 15 March, asked the following questions when he spoke about the effectiveness of control and the guarantees which should be included in a treaty with regard to its implementation:

"We should like to ask what deterrent factor there can be in the absence of an agreement. How can there be effective control if there is no agreement and hence no control? What is the best way of ensuring implementation of the treaty?" (ENDC/PV.109, p.17)

He gave the answer when he referred to his earlier statement and summarized it as follows:

"In the last analysis the essential, and the strongest, safeguard for the parties is submission to the rule of international law and ethics and respect for the pledged word." (ENDC/PV.34, p.17)

My delegation entirely agrees with that view. Many jurists will agree that the law is obeyed not merely because of the existence of deterrents. Indeed, the jurisprudence of many lands accepts the view that, if we were to explain why any kind of law is binding, we could not avoid some such assumption as that which was made in the Middle Ages, and which Greece and Rome made before that when they spoke of natural law. The ultimate explanation, therefore, of the binding force of law is that man, whether he is a single individual or is associated with other men in a State, is constrained, in so far as he is a reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing principle of the world in which he has to live. That is the true reason why any law is obeyed. The same reason applies to treaty law. I think that no State party to a treaty on a test ban would wish to face the international obloquy which awaits a defaulter or a party wantonly causing a breach of that treaty.

Even if one party were to cause such a breach, there is implied in every treaty a clause which provides that the treaty is to be binding only so long as things stand as they are. The express term may be absolute, but a treaty is never more than conditional, and when a vital change of circumstances has occurred the condition of the treaty's validity has failed, and it ceases to be binding. This is the essence of the ancient maxim "Clausula rebus sic stantibus." Certainly a test ban treaty



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should not be likened to the ancient laws of the Medes and the Persians, which never changed. Even in Persia the ancient laws are gradually admitting great innovations: for example, the women of that kingdom were recently given the franchise to vote -- at least so we read in the newspapers.

Let the nuclear Powers try, in a constructive sense, to negotiate. Their motto should never be "If at first you don't succeed, never, never try again." That is a defeatist attitude; and to adopt it would be a clear negation of our efforts. The world would be better off with an imperfect treaty than without one. The conclusion of a test ban treaty would be the first positive step towards general and complete disarmament. It would call a halt to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Above all, we should be acting in compliance with paragraph 6 of resolution 1762 (XVII) of the General Assembly, which recommends

"... that if, against all hope, the parties concerned do not reach agreement on the cessation of all tests by 1 January 1963, they should enter into an immediate agreement prohibiting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, accompanied by an interim arrangement suspending all underground tests, taking as a basis the eight-nation memorandum<sup>1/</sup> and taking into consideration other proposals presented at the seventeenth session of the General Assembly, such interim agreement to include adequate assurances for effective detection and identification of seismic events by an international scientific commission". (ENDC/63)

I should like to mention here that that General Assembly resolution is almost out of date at the present stage of the development of these negotiations. However, we are happy to note that the three nuclear Powers have ended their series of tests. We sincerely hope, therefore, that there will be no further testing until a final and lasting treaty is signed ending all tests in all environments.

The logic of a particular nuclear Power insisting upon carrying on tests now is difficult to comprehend. At the meeting of this Committee on 20 December 1962 the representative of Nigeria had this to say about the proposed nuclear tests in the Sahara:

"My delegation strongly supports the General Assembly resolution, especially now when we are reminded that another series of nuclear tests is shortly to be carried out in the Sahara. My delegation recognizes

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that any State is at liberty to use its own territory for any purpose it deems necessary, including the testing of nuclear weapons. But if such tests cause injury to life, health or property of subjects of other sovereign States, the general rules of international law apply. Therefore, if damage is suffered, the act which has caused such injury constitutes an illegal interference with the sphere of exclusive jurisdiction of the States concerned". (ENDC/PV.95, p.60)

I am glad, therefore, that the Government of the Republic of Algeria has recalled its Ambassador to Paris for consultation and has, in an official statement, expressed the view that the French tests in the Sahara create a very grave situation.

It is self-evident that there are still some nations which have not purged themselves of the concept of Africa which they knew before the Berlin Conference of 1885. It should be clear to all nations by now that the Africa of the 1960s is no longer a terra nullius capable of being acquired by any State and used for all sorts of dangerous experiments; and, since international law does not recognize servitudes, the question of praedium serviens should not arise over the Sahara territory. I am sure that, despite the entente between France and West Germany, President de Gaulle would not make much headway if he tried to claim an easement over Chancellor Adenauer's vineyard.

In any event, what does any State derive from nuclear explosions, apart from developing weapons of mass destruction? Is it not illusory to think of nuclear weapons as effective weapons of war when the use of such weapons in any war means that there will be no victor and no vanquished? Why? Because the belligerents will all perish. There is therefore no logic in continuing with nuclear explosions.

As has already been rightly observed by our friend the representative of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/PV.99, p.17), the description of our efforts as "an exercise in futility" will be difficult to refute unless the nuclear Powers are willing to view their own interests in the larger context of the interests of international society as a whole. This is the essence of the compromise which is needed to get us out of a nasty quagmire. Because we face the common perils of atomic war, let us regard ourselves as members of the same

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biological species -- man -- whose continued existence is in doubt. Certainly no nuclear Power could consciously desire the extinction of man's remarkable history and heritage. We, the small nations, have in our hands a unique part to play in this Conference. We must not choose the path of universal death because the East and the West cannot forget their prestige quarrels. We remain undaunted in our efforts to break the deadlock, realizing that neither the East nor the West can truly claim to further its best national interests through the irresponsible race for nuclear armaments.

I would therefore conclude my remarks this morning by quoting what I said on 15 February:

"My delegation has at all times maintained that it is pointless talking about disarmament unless an effective stop is put to the perfection of these diabolical weapons of mass annihilation and naked aggression against humanity." (ENDC/FV.98, p.31)

Let us get on with the job with a genuine and sincere desire to reach agreement. It is not impossible. It is still negotiable. Victory is our goal, compromise makes it possible.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): At the beginning of the remarks made by the representative of Bulgaria I found myself somewhat at a loss to know what item he was discussing. That confusion on my part went on for some time. He had much to say about a NATO multilateral force and a good deal to say about continuation of underground nuclear weapon tests. But towards the end of his remarks he did have something to say about the item with which we agreed we should begin our discussions this morning -- a nuclear weapon test ban treaty.

In those remarks on the subject of our discussion I found something which, while perhaps it was not helpful, might be taken as a little hopeful. He had some unkind words to say (supra, p.12) about a formula which was given for illustrative purposes here by the representative of Canada, and which, as I understand it, had the main purpose of demonstrating the direct bearing that modalities would have on numbers of inspections. But before that Mr. Tarabanov had something to say (supra, p.10) about what the United States delegation had described as its ideas on the composition of an inspection team.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

What he had to say was, I thought, not particularly helpful. First, he said that there was no point in discussing that question, because the Soviet Union said that inspections were not necessary anyway, so why talk about the composition of an inspection team? He then went on with an implied criticism of the United States position on the ground that previously we had taken up positions which were somewhat different. He said that we had appeared to ignore that fact. We did not ignore that fact. I believe that, if the records of what was said by my delegation on that occasion are checked, it will be found that we did say we thought it was useful to give greater weight to the reciprocal elements of inspection, now that we were talking about a different kind of system and about numbers of inspections which could be expressed in one digit (ENDC/FV.108, pp.5,6).

However, what I found perhaps slightly hopeful in the remarks of the representative of Bulgaria was that at least one of the colleagues of the representative of the Soviet Union has now, in an indirect way, entered into a discussion of the positions on modalities or arrangements which the United States has put forward. The Soviet delegation has strenuously abstained from any such discussion; but despite the fact that the Bulgarian representative's statement had nothing good to say about the position that the United States has taken on that one particular matter, at least he entered into a certain amount of discussion of that particular element of the United States position, in giving reasons why it should not be discussed. I hesitate to say too much, because certainly it is not my purpose to discourage that kind of a "discussion by not discussing" on the part of our Eastern-bloc colleagues; but perhaps if they would express their views, even if they were critical, it might help us to go forward and we might perhaps draw some inklings of ideas from the things we say that they do not discuss critically. Therefore, in a way I found certain of the remarks made by the representative of Bulgaria this morning, as I have said, not helpful but hopeful.

I listened with great interest to the statement made by the representative of Nigeria. There was no question at all concerning what item he was talking about; he was talking about a test-ban treaty. He had much to say about it. I thought his remarks were constructive, careful and erudite, and my delegation will want to study them in the record. I was particularly struck by one simple statement made by Mr. Mbu when he said (supra, p. 15) that, after all, the parties to a treaty should know what it was all about. It seems to me that that is an eminently convincing statement.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

It reminded me of what our Secretary of State had to say about the question of on-site inspections when he said, "When we talk about numbers of inspections, we want to know the number of what. In order to talk about numbers we should know what we are talking about."

At the meeting of this Conference on 13 March the United States delegation put forward a broad outline of its views on the arrangements which should govern the conduct of an on-site inspection (ENDC/FV.108, pp.7,8). In addition, we made clear some of our views with regard to the use and the functioning of automatic seismic stations. The Soviet representative replied to our statement at that meeting in a manner that was both unhelpful and not hopeful. He charged once again that the United States wished only to discuss what he termed technical issues. He indicated that the Soviet delegation believed that the United States only wished to discuss the so-called technical issues to torpedo these negotiations. My delegation vigorously rejects that contention. Only a delegation which desired to avoid agreement would avoid discussing the major issues. We earnestly hope that that is not the intention of the Soviet representative.

In order to reassure the Soviet representative, my delegation has not asked for, nor will it press for, the discussion of technical details as the next item of business for this Conference. What we wish to do is to discuss the major outstanding issues -- I repeat, the major outstanding issues. Far from torpedoing the work of the Conference, our efforts are designed to forward its work. I must say that to us those efforts appear to have the support of most of the members of this Committee.

We have reached agreement in principle on on-site inspection, or at least my delegation had believed we had reached agreement in principle until 13 March. At that meeting the Soviet representative said:

"We do not object to discussing the method of carrying out inspection after we have an agreement on inspection and, consequently, when we know that inspections will be carried out. But at present we have no agreement on inspection at all ... since we have no agreement, we fail to understand why we should discuss the methods of carrying out inspection." (ENDC/FV.108,p.33)

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

It seems to me that the Soviet representative may have hit on a point where a genuine misunderstanding exists; or perhaps we misunderstood his words, or perhaps his words might have been chosen more carefully. My delegation believes that there is now agreement in principle that there will be on-site inspections. We do not question that point. Acceptance of the principle of on-site inspection is a central part of the letters exchanged between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy (ENDC/73,74). If the Soviet representative really does not believe that we have agreed that there will be on-site inspections, I hope he will clarify that for us at once.

But let us assume that, as we are sure is the case, we have agreement that there will be on-site inspections. There remains now a procedural dispute about how we should negotiate on the application of that principle of on-site inspection and upon the other essential arrangements of the verification system. We firmly believe that the application of the principle of on-site inspection involves a number of factors. Those factors can be conveniently broken down under two main headings: the number of on-site inspections, and the arrangements for the conduct of on-site inspection -- what we have been calling the modalities.

The Soviet representative has said that the only subjects which can be discussed are the numbers of on-site inspections and the numbers of automatic seismic stations, and that the only numbers which can be agreed are the numbers proposed by the Soviet Union. We have said that we believe there are other major issues which also must be resolved, any one of which impinges upon the arrangements reached in regard to the others. We are perfectly willing to discuss all -- I repeat, all -- major issues so long as we are not told that we must first concentrate on any one of those issues without hearing the views of the other side with respect to the rest of them. We are not taking the position that all other issues except the number of on-site inspections must be settled before the quota number can be agreed. Quite to the contrary, we are only asking now that each side state at least the outline of a complete position so that we know where each of us stands with regard to the major issues.

In order to make this Conference completely clear about where my delegation stands, I propose today to discuss in somewhat more detail than I did at our one hundred and eighth meeting various aspects of some of the major issues of on-site inspection. What I say today is in further clarification of my delegation's position.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We believe that our clarifications this morning will assist the work of the Conference. But let me stress to the Conference at this point that we do not propose that a discussion of major issues should of necessity take up and agree upon every point of detail. The broad issues could readily be settled in tentative general agreement, with points such as we intend to present here today to be agreed in later treaty drafting sessions. These points are offered merely by way of informing the delegations further about the position of the United States.

As I pointed out on 13 March, the arrangements which my delegation set forth at that meeting relate solely to inspection on the territories of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States (ENDC/FV.103, p.6). We believe generally that there should be an agreed sequence and orderly procedure for the carrying out of on-site inspection. Only in that way will all States have assurance that the complete inspection process will take place in an orderly manner, thereby maximizing both the deterrent and the confidence-building effect of each on-site inspection.

The process will be based on the collection of seismic data. National seismic stations around the world will detect events on the territory of the three nuclear Powers now negotiating here. Those data will be analysed and discussed by officials in the national seismic systems. They will also be transmitted from the stations in the national seismic networks, which will be listed in the treaty, to the international commission and to the other nuclear side. If, for example, an event were detected in a well-known aseismic -- I repeat, aseismic -- area of one of the nuclear States, the other side might well wish to designate that event as subject to on-site inspection.

In our opinion, a State should have sixty days from the time a seismic event took place to designate that event as subject to on-site inspection. Under the designation process the other nuclear side would send a statement to the commission and, through it, to the country in which the event occurred. The statement would indicate the location of the event and the time of its occurrence. It would forward the data from at least four seismic stations by which the event was located. Those data would have to meet certain location criteria listed in the treaty. In addition, the statement would have to indicate that the event could not be identified as an

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

earthquake from data available to the designating State. The criteria against which the designating State would test its data to determine whether the event was an earthquake would also be listed in the treaty.

We believe location criteria along the lines contained in article VIII of the draft comprehensive test ban treaty of 27 August 1962 (ENDC/58) would be adequate. Those criteria provide that an event should be considered located when seismic signals whose frequencies, amplitudes, durations and velocities are consistent with those of waves from earthquakes or explosions are recorded at a sufficient number of stations to establish the approximate time and position of the event. We have agreed with the Soviet Union in the past that location requires records from at least four stations. The records from those four stations must show clearly-measurable arrival times of identifiable phases which are mutually consistent to within plus or minus three seconds. In addition, we have agreed with the Soviet Union in the past that the four mutually-consistent arrival times must include P-wave arrival times at three different detection stations. P-waves are those which pass through the area below the crust of the earth. We wish to know now whether the Soviet Union still agrees with those criteria or whether it has other criteria to propose.

In addition, in our view the designating country must declare, on the basis of the criteria, that the event designated is not identified as an earthquake. The following criteria would, as we have agreed in the past with the Soviet Union, identify an event as an earthquake.

First: if the depth of focus of the event is established as below 60 kilometres. That means that the origin of the event would be located more than 60 kilometres deep within the earth.

Second: if the event is located under the deep ocean and is not recorded on hydro-acoustical apparatus.

Third: if the event is clearly established as the fore-shock or after-shock of an earthquake of at least magnitude six which has been clearly identified as an earthquake by one of the previous criteria. Also, a fore-shock should occur as part of a sequence of earthquakes less than forty-eight hours before the main shock, and an after-shock as part of a sequence less than a week following the main shock, with the epicentre of the fore-shock or after-shock located within a given agreed distance of the main shock. We should now also like to know if the Soviet Union still agrees to the use of that criterion.



(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The State on whose territory the event took place should, in our opinion, have a week to provide all supplementary information which it had and which it might wish to make available concerning the event. Such data would be given to the commission and, through it, to the designating State. It might include data not previously available from national seismic systems, as well as any other information which would bear on the nature of the event.

During that one-week period we believe the designating State should also have the opportunity to examine the data collected by the sealed recording instruments in the automatic seismic stations in the host country territory. Such visits to retrieve data should, of course, as we have said previously, be made only eight times each year. The retrieval should be accomplished by personnel from the designating side and from the international commission. The data collected might well indicate that the event in question was not one which should be inspected. We believe that the designating State should then be given an additional week to digest and analyse the information which might be provided both from the automatic seismic stations and from the State on whose territory the event had taken place. If before the lapse of that one-week period the designating State wished to select the event for on-site inspection, it would have to submit a further statement. If the period passed without a selection for inspection, the event would no longer be eligible for inspection.

A State selecting an event for on-site inspection would, in our view, have to provide in its further statement information on the location and boundaries of the area selected for inspection. The area would, of course, have to conform to agreed treaty criteria. We have proposed that an inspection area should surround the epicentre and should contain no more than 500 square kilometres. In addition, we have stated that the area should be elliptical in shape and that the semi-major axis should be no more than fifteen kilometres in length. In somewhat clearer English, that means that the maximum permitted longest dimension of the ellipse should be thirty kilometres.

In addition, the statement selecting an event for inspection should include information on the proposed time and place of arrival of the inspection team at the borders of the receiving State. The receiving State would then have a period

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

of five days to indicate the arrangements it would make for the reception of the inspection team and for the transport of the team to the inspection area. It is at that point that the receiving State would also be permitted to file a report indicating the presence of a sensitive defence installation in the inspection area. The designating State would then have to exercise its option of either continuing the inspection, with the exclusion of the sensitive defence installation, or of cancelling the inspection and preserving the quota number for future use.

We hope that this statement we have made will further clarify the position of the United States on some of the major issues. We continue to urge the Soviet delegation to provide us with its comments on any or all of these important questions, so that we may promptly proceed to meaningful and successful negotiations on a test ban treaty.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Today I should like to reply briefly to the representative of the United States, and at the same time to the representative of Nigeria, with regard to one point. The representative of Nigeria said today that it was logical that the parties to any treaty should know what the treaty is all about; and the representative of the United States also said today that the United States wanted to know **how** on-site inspections would be carried out before concluding an agreement. But first of all I must say that, in the case of the representative of Nigeria, there is apparently a misunderstanding, since the Soviet delegation has never proposed that we first sign an agreement and only afterwards explain to the United States what we mean by inspection. That is not how the matter stands.

There is also a misunderstanding in the case of the United States when it says that it wants to know all about the treaty, how inspection would be carried out, what would be the area, what should be the criteria, what would be the depth of focus of an earthquake, the question of magnitude, and, as Mr. Stelle mentioned today, questions of fore-shocks, after-shocks and so on. All these details will be discussed, if necessary, before the United States and the Soviet Union put their signatures to an agreement. In this connexion the United States representative is trying to force an open door.

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

But we must have a clear idea of where the United States approach would lead and where the Soviet Union approach would lead. The United States approach would lead us into a maze of sterile technical discussions on which the side not desiring an agreement would wreck the negotiations; and the blame would be ascribed to technical differences rather than to the political line of that Power. If, however, we agree, as the Soviet Union proposes, first on the number of inspections and on the number of automatic seismic stations, and immediately thereafter set about agreeing on all the technical details, such an approach would lead to an agreement. The difference is perfectly clear.

We are faced with two prospects. If we follow the course proposed by the United States, we shall inevitably land in a morass of endless technical discussions and the United States will be blameless in the eyes of the world. In the eyes of the world the situation will appear like this "We failed to agree on fore-shocks and after-shocks; we failed to agree on how to determine the depth of focus of an earthquake or seismic event; we failed to agree on criteria; and we failed to agree on the perimeter of the area to be inspected, its diameter, its form, whether it should be oval, round or square, and so on."

If we really desire to have an agreement, then we must agree on a quota of two to three inspections a year. That is the figure which the United States named to us as being acceptable to it for an agreement. We accepted it, and now the United States cannot reject it unless it wishes to wreck an agreement. Of course it is free to do so, but we will not go further to any other figure. An agreement is within our reach. Two to three inspections are a good number, and this is the key to an agreement. Any attempt to wring from the Soviet Union further opportunities for intelligence purposes is doomed to failure.

The situation before us is perfectly clear: either we come to an agreement on the basis of the compromise suggested by the Soviet Union, or the negotiations will break down; they will be engulfed in a morass of unending, sterile technical discussions, and then, of course, it will be easy for the United States to avoid the responsibility for their failure. And then none of

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

you will understand who was responsible. Then everything will be entangled in an enormous skein of technical details, and not only of technical details: there may also be financial, administrative, organizational and other details -- no one will understand anything. It will be quite impossible to make out who was responsible and why there is no agreement. But at present the situation is perfectly clear: we propose reaching agreement on two to three inspections a year and three automatic seismic stations. Does the United States accept this compromise proposal? If it does not accept, then it is to blame for the fact that there is no agreement.

I wish to add just this. I stress once again, and draw the attention of the representative of Nigeria, and of all the other members of the Committee, to the fact that the United States is dissembling when it says that it does not want to come to an agreement without knowing what is meant by inspection. This is not true. It will know, and we shall all know what is meant by inspection. If the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle, will tell us that it accepts two to three inspections and three automatic seismic stations, we shall begin the negotiations on technical details straight away at today's meeting.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): We have heard again the completely inaccurate statement from the representative of the Soviet Union that the figure of two to three on-site inspections was a figure named as acceptable by the United States. We have demonstrated the facts, but the facts seem to have no influence on the Soviet delegation; it continues to repeat a statement which is completely inaccurate. I must repeat again for the record that the figure of two to three on-site inspections has never been and is not acceptable to the United States. The Soviet representative said very clearly today that he wanted to discuss only numbers of on-site inspections and numbers of automatic seismic stations, and he went on to say that the Soviet Union would not go further to any other figure than two to three on-site inspections. That is a figure which the Soviet Union has known and knows is unacceptable to the United States. This "take-it-or-leave-it" approach is not negotiation. I submit that if it is persisted in and negotiations fail, there will be crystal clarity as to which side is responsible for that failure.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We hope and we sincerely believe that there will not be a failure in these important, in these vital, negotiations; and to move the negotiations forward the Soviet delegation must admit that what an inspection is, what events are eligible, who should form the inspection team, where they may look -- that all these things have a direct bearing on the question of what number of on-site inspections will provide the deterrent and confidence-building effects that we believe, and that we think most delegations agree, are necessary for a sound nuclear test ban treaty.

The Soviet representative has talked of what discussion of the main outlines of the modalities of on-site inspection would do to our negotiations, and he has said repeatedly that it would mean our being engulfed in a morass of detail. He mentioned just now such admittedly technical things as fore-shocks, after-shocks and depths of epicentres. But we do not need to go into technical detail to find out what the Soviet position is on those questions. All we need from the Soviet representative is a simple statement whether the position of his delegation has changed since we last agreed upon those technical details. One word would dispose of that part of the modalities for on-site inspection. The Soviet delegation would only have to say it continued to agree to what it had agreed to before. And if the Soviet delegation has major objections to other elements of the modalities which we have proposed, let it say so; but let it not hide behind the inaccurate assertion that this would lead the Conference into a morass of detail.

There have been many technical discussions. Here the case that the Soviet representative frequently makes: that this is a political rather than a technical question, is all too true. All that is needed is the political will of the Soviet Union to indicate in broad terms what it conceives to be the general arrangements for on-site inspection, for us to be able to go forward with our negotiations towards the successful end to which we all --- and I repeat, and sincerely believe, we all -- aspire.

Mr. MBU (Nigeria): I think I ought to exercise my right of reply in order to explain the remarks I made this morning. I will read the record I have, and I am quite sure the interpreters did justice to what I said. Speaking about the present controversy over numbers and modalities, I said:

(Mr. Mbu, Nigeria)

"It is inconceivable that the controversy which has arisen over the numbers and modalities of on-site inspection might yet rob us of a test-ban treaty during this current session." (supra, p. 15)

I went on to say:

"It is inconceivable ... because my delegation regards the remaining differences as infinitesimal." (ibid.)

Then I added:

"The more one tries to appreciate the logic of the present controversy, the more one finds oneself confounded. The comparison ... concerning which came first, the chicken or the egg, may be apposite to the controversy over the numbers and modalities of on-site inspection." (ibid.)

Then, after telling a little story about the Red Queen, I added:

"It is, of course, logical that the parties to any treaty should know what the treaty is all about." (ibid.)

Now, no unbiased deduction from what I said could in any way infer or imply that I had it in the back of my mind that a discussion on technical matters should immediately ensue. I have always claimed that I am not competent to discuss such things. When we speak of logic, of course, most of those things might be germane; but perhaps this is not the best forum for the discussion of technical matters. I have never discussed that.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I wish to reply once again, but first I wish to thank the representative of Nigeria for the clarification he has just offered, and then to reply briefly to the representative of the United States.

We are compelled to note with regret that the United States delegation is in fact continuing to sabotage the negotiations by continuing to ignore the compromise proposal on the inspection quota, which is the key to an agreement, and on the number of automatic seismic stations. The United States representative has just told us that the quota of two to three inspections, although this number of inspections had been named by the United States itself as acceptable, is now

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

unacceptable to it. If that is so, the question arises why we should enter into a discussion of technical details. If we are not agreed on an inspection quota of two to three a year, there is no agreement. And if there is no agreement, there is no need for technical discussions. In the absence of agreement on the basic issues -- on a quota of two to three inspections and on the number of automatic seismic stations, that is, three on the territory of each of the nuclear Powers -- technical discussions would have no material value; they would be purely abstract disputes devoid of any material value. We are against abstract discussions.

I repeat once again that, if the United States intends to come to an agreement, if it tells us that it agrees to the inspection quota of two to three inspections a year, and that it agrees to the number of automatic seismic stations, we will proceed immediately to a discussion of all the other questions which interest you, Mr. Stelle, and we will come to an agreement on them also. Then the way to agreement will be open. But to enter into technical discussions without agreement on the main basic issues that divide us -- on the question of the inspection quota and on the question of the number of automatic seismic stations -- would be, I repeat, a sterile, abstract and pointless discussion without any value for the possibilities of an agreement. On the contrary, it would only confuse the actual situation and create the false impression that something was being done and that negotiations on something were being carried on, when in fact we should be faced with a complete deadlock.

Everything depends upon the position of the United States. Two to three inspections is a good basis for an agreement. We cannot, in the present state of the relations between the Western Powers and the Soviet Union, go any further than we already have gone. We made an important political concession by agreeing at all to allowing international inspection on Soviet territory. And when we agreed to two to three inspections it was a basis for an agreement, a manifestation of the exceptional good will of the Soviet Union. But the United States wishes to have greater opportunities to penetrate into the

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Soviet Union than two to three times a year. No, gentlemen, do not place the interests of your intelligence agencies above the interests of humanity, above the interests of all those sitting at this table. Moderate your appetites, and then an agreement will be reached. But with the present position of the United States an agreement is of course impossible, and everyone realizes this.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think that after this morning's statements by the United States and Soviet delegations, the situation is as follows.

The United States delegation is prepared to discuss methods of inspection. At our meeting on 13 March (ENDC/PV.108, pp.6 et seq.) and this morning it presented clear and concrete proposals. It has submitted these to the Committee for examination and is prepared to discuss them. The United States delegation is also prepared to discuss the number of inspections in conjunction with the methods it has proposed.

The Soviet delegation, on the other hand, does not wish to negotiate on any method of inspection. It continues to ignore the proposals which have been put forward on this subject. What is more, the Soviet delegation wishes neither to discuss nor to negotiate upon the number of inspections. It is asking for one thing only: the full acceptance of its figure of three inspections. In this connexion, I put the following question to the Soviet delegation at our previous meeting:

"... but we are completely ignorant of the technical reasons for the Soviet position, and we do not know why this number three cannot be modified. Above all, we should like to know why a number of inspections greater than three would be prejudicial and dangerous for the Soviet Union, and why it is considered unacceptable." (ENDC/PV.109, p.8)

This question which I put to the Soviet delegation has so far remained unanswered.

In any case I would request the Soviet delegation not to speak here of a breakdown in our negotiations, especially now that we all know that a contribution which will certainly be of great value to this



(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Committee's work is soon to be made by the delegations of the eight non-aligned States. Doubtless this contribution will be directed towards a compromise agreement. I should not like the Soviet delegation to prevent this effort at conciliation by insisting now upon the figure of three inspections as an ultimatum. That would indeed be to sabotage the Committee's work. I cannot imagine that this will be done, since we have all heard many affirmations of good will from the Soviet delegation. My delegation wishes to believe in the sincerity of these affirmations, in spite of the methods of work upon which the Soviet delegation is insisting and which cannot fail to give rise to certain initial doubts and suspicions.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I asked for the floor before the clarifying remarks on the present situation were made by the representative of Italy, and I believe that I have nothing to add to what he has just said.

Mr. TSAR/PKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): With regard to the technical questions touched upon by the representative of Italy in his brief statement, I have already given exhaustive replies and do not intend to repeat them.

His remark on the inspection quota leaves a rather strange impression, because it shows that the Western delegations want to secure at all costs what they are after: an increased number of inspections; although we have already said that we have accepted the compromise proposal put forward in unofficial conversations with the United States representative and that the Soviet Union does not intend to go any further. This is a basis for an agreement, and if the United States does not want to agree on that basis, which it considered suitable and acceptable to it some time ago, then that, of course, is the responsibility of the United States.

We do not think that Mr. Cavalletti has any grounds for the hope that the non-aligned States will come to the aid of the United States and join forces with the Western Powers in their attempts to get the Soviet Union to increase the number of inspections. I do not think the situation will develop in the way the representative

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

of Italy imagines. I do not think that the United States will find among the non-aligned States any allies who will pander to its desire to get a larger quota of inspections from the Soviet Union.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): As I said, I had not meant to take the floor, but the Soviet representative has again seen fit to repeat the inaccurate statement that the number of two to three on-site inspections was acceptable to the United States. The record is clear. The number of two to three on-site inspections has never been, and is not, acceptable to the United States. We believe that a discussion of modalities -- a wider agreement on the broad arrangements for on-site inspection -- might make agreement on numbers easier. But, as I have said, I believe that the record of that at our previous meetings is clear; and my delegation is, for the moment, quite content to rest upon the record.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): If there are no more speakers on the nuclear test ban issue, then, with the permission of the Committee and pursuant to its decision of last Friday (ENDC/FV.109, p.43), I shall now proceed to call on those representatives who have notified us that they wish to speak on procedure.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): The week-end has been an aid to thought. I can assure you that I have added nothing to my statement, and in fact I have been able to shorten it. On behalf of the Polish delegation, I should like to make a few remarks about our Conference's future work.

First of all, I should like to state that the Polish delegation shares the opinions of the two co-Chairmen, which reflect the unanimous view of our Committee; that is to say, that we should concentrate our main attention upon the problem of a nuclear test ban. The importance of this problem demands that we should spare no effort to reduce the differences which still exist between the positions of parties and to reach an agreement as soon as possible. We also note the recommendation of the co-Chairmen to set aside the necessary time for the discussion of general and

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

complete disarmament, beginning with points 5(b) and 5(c) of document ENDC/52 (ENDC/FV.108, p.34). We shall thus be putting into effect the resolution passed by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 20 December 1961 setting up our Committee (A/RES/1722(XVI)), and the resolution adopted at the General Assembly's last session (A/RES/1767(XVII)).

This will also enable us to re-examine the problems of eliminating nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the light of new proposals submitted by the Soviet Union which envisage the retention by the Soviet Union and the United States until the end of the second stage, and exclusively upon their own territory, of an agreed and strictly limited number of inter-continental missiles and also of anti-missile missiles and ground-to-air anti-aircraft missiles (ENDC/2/Rev.1, p.5). The discussion of this proposal, which was received with interest by many countries, has not yet passed beyond the preliminary stage. The time has come to submit it to a careful examination.

The Polish delegation believes that we should now determine the order of discussion of partial measures the implementation of which might contribute substantially to the reduction of international tension and might facilitate the accomplishment of our principal task: the elaboration of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

I cannot share the opinion of the United States representative, who suggested last Friday that we should adopt a scientific approach, founded this time on pure mathematics, to the solution of this problem (ENDC/FV.109, p.41). I find it difficult to believe that the United States delegation can seriously envisage the replacement of a decision based on the conscious appreciation of political factors by an automatism whose only merit would be its obedience to the rules of arithmetic.

For our part we believe that two criteria should be taken into consideration; realism and urgency. In choosing our subjects we must therefore give priority to those which lend themselves to constructive discussion, offer opportunities for an agreement, and take into account the international situation. All this leads us to

(Mr. Blusztajn, Poland)

advocate a discussion of the problems relating to the danger of a nuclear conflict, and of all those measures whose implementation could reduce immediately and in a tangible manner the threat of a nuclear war.

The Polish delegation therefore considers that the first problem to be included in our agenda for the discussion of partial measures should be the Declaration on renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), which was submitted by the Soviet delegation. At the same time we could undertake discussion of the proposals presented by the United States delegation on reduction of the risk of war. (ENDC/70). Next we should examine the draft submitted by the Soviet delegation relating to the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty and the members of NATO (ENDC/77). Lastly, it is time to initiate a serious discussion on the creation of denuclearized zones.

We note that the United States delegation has agreed to discuss the draft declaration submitted by the Soviet Union. To my mind this represents an implicit recognition of the importance of the criteria which we have submitted. In common with other delegations, we consider that the elimination of strategic nuclear bases stationed on foreign territory could contribute to reducing the risk of war through accident, and to increasing confidence in international relations and the security of all States. The implementation of the Soviet proposal could also serve as a proving ground which would provide us with elements for the solution of the different problems that arise in relation to general and complete disarmament and the elimination of bases on foreign territory.

The Polish delegation considers that the urgent discussion of the draft non-aggression pact between the States signatories of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO States is justified by the present international situation. These two military blocs represent a concentration of war potential previously unknown to humanity. An armed conflict between them might easily degenerate into a world-wide nuclear war. It is undeniable that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact whereby the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the States parties to the North Atlantic Treaty would solemnly undertake to refrain from any aggression, from any threat of force and from

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all use of force, and also to resolve exclusively by peaceful means all disputes which might arise between them, would considerably strengthen the peace of Europe and of the whole world.

The picture of the international situation painted by the Soviet representative during last Friday's meeting (ENDC/PV.109, pp.24 et seq) emphasizes still more the importance and the urgency of concluding such a treaty. Poland has a particular interest in the signature of a non-aggression pact between the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty and the NATO countries. This is not because we believe that such an instrument can solve all the problems which at present divide the two blocs. A non-aggression pact will not solve automatically the problem of liquidating the consequences of the Second World War. It will not solve automatically the problem of the recognition of the frontiers which were set up at the end of the last war. Such an instrument will not replace the peace treaty still to be concluded with Germany, nor will it replace a solution of the problem of West Berlin. Lastly, a non-aggression pact will not reduce the dangers to world peace constituted by the strategic plans of the Western Powers and the atomic armament of the Bundeswehr.

However, we are sure that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the two blocs could initiate a movement towards the solution of the difficult problems which are in abeyance. This is an instrument which can strengthen considerably the position of those circles in the West who declare themselves in favour of peaceful co-existence and the solution of international differences by negotiation. I think that all this suffices to justify the discussion of the draft submitted by the Soviet delegation (ENDC/77).

The signature of such a non-aggression pact would also react favourably upon our Conference's work by offering mutual guarantees of security to all countries, a matter of great importance in the period preceding the implementation of general and complete disarmament. This treaty can be concluded immediately. It does not require any long preparations, it does not imply the setting up of any new international machinery, and it does not prejudice the rights and obligations which the parties have incurred as a result of their international commitments. Moreover, the idea of concluding a non-aggression pact between the signatories of the Warsaw

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Treaty and the NATO States is no new one. It has its adherents amongst the members of our Committee. It has the support of the United Kingdom Government. It has been supported by certain non-aligned countries in our Committee, including Ethiopia and Nigeria. The statement made last Friday by the Soviet representative (ENDC/FV.109, pp.24 et seq) relieves me of the need to refute all those arguments which have been put forward in our Committee against the discussion of the Soviet draft.

However, I should like to make two remarks on this subject. It seems to me that one cannot affirm that a non-aggression pact does not constitute a disarmament measure without coming into conflict with the United States contention that a discussion should be undertaken on the reduction of the risk of war, which would also not imply any concrete step towards disarmament.

It seems to me too that the argument that the conclusion of a non-aggression pact would be superfluous in view of the existence of the United Nations Charter cannot be regarded as valid. International practice provides many examples of States renewing in their mutual relations commitments which are implied by the general principles of international law, in order to emphasize the particular importance which they attach to those principles and to show their wish to respect them. If one were to accept the arguments of the Western delegations on this subject, one would no longer be free to conclude any treaty of friendship or mutual assistance confirming the right of self-defence sanctioned by the United Nations Charter (Article 51). It would also be impossible to retain certain parts of the United States draft treaty on general and complete disarmament (ENDC/30), which also repeats a series of general principles contained in the United Nations Charter.

The Polish delegation considers that the Committee should also decide to place on its agenda the discussion of the problem of creating denuclearized zones. We have already had occasion to draw the Committee's attention to the importance of this problem. I should like once more to indicate three arguments which in our opinion show the necessity and the urgency of such a discussion. First, the idea of denuclearized zones is almost universally supported. Secondly, the creation of

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denuclearized zones is an efficient method of avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons. Thirdly, the creation of such zones in certain predetermined regions can go far to reduce the danger of a nuclear conflict.

The Polish delegation wishes to emphasize the importance it attaches to the creation of a denuclearized zone in Central Europe. A proposal to that effect was submitted to the Committee by our delegation on 28 March last year (ENDC/C.1/1). We hope that this proposal will soon be carefully examined by our Conference.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I believe that, in order to examine the problem of the agenda of the Committee of the Whole objectively, reference to its history will be useful. The Committee of the Whole is not a new creation, but has already been in action and has had an agenda, on which considerable efforts had been expended. At the very beginning of our Conference we ran into trouble, because lists of questions were put forward both on the Western and on the Eastern side (ENDC/C.1/2), and we were unable to agree upon the discussion of all these questions in the Committee of the Whole. At that time, since an escape had to be sought from the deadlock, attempts were made to find a compromise formula on the basis of one question from the Western list and one from the Eastern list. It was thought that a balanced system could thus be established which would prejudice nobody.

It was then that the Western delegations made their first concession to the Eastern delegations by agreeing that the first collateral measure to be discussed should be the Soviet proposal concerning steps to be taken for the prohibition of war propaganda (ENDC/C.1/3). The Committee knows how the examination of this question ended. After efforts which lasted, I think, almost a month, we reached agreement on a text (ENDC/C.1/20), and three days later this text was rejected by the Soviet delegation (ENDC/C.1/21; ENDC/FV.44).

After this unhappy episode we should, in the ordinary course of events, have passed on to examine a Western proposal. However, at that time, in spite of the efforts made both by my delegation and by others, notably by the

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delegation of the United Arab Republic, to give fresh impetus to the activities of the Committee of the Whole, the Soviet delegation slowed down and effectively blocked the work of the Committee of the Whole for several weeks, in fact I think for several months. Finally the Soviet delegation, realizing the necessity of resuming the meetings of the Committee of the Whole, consented to discuss in parallel and alternately one measure proposed by the West and one proposed by the East -- the risk of war by accident (ENDC/70), and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/C.1/19). In accepting this the Western delegations made another concession, for, after the examination of measures to be taken for the prohibition of war propaganda, they had a right in their turn to insist upon the discussion of one of the measures that they had proposed, whereas in fact we agreed to associate a Soviet proposal with the discussion of one of our proposals.

The discussion on the risk of war and on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was begun in the Committee of the Whole (ENDC/C.1/PV.9); but we could not pursue it to a conclusion, because the Committee went into recess in September. What is the situation now? It seems to me that the Soviet delegation wishes to go back on the agreement we concluded previously concerning the alternate discussion of measures to reduce the risk of war and to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, and is asking for the discussion as a matter of priority of two fresh proposals which it has presented: the declaration on the renunciation of the use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), which is well known to the Committee, and the draft non-aggression pact (ENDC/77). On the other hand, the Soviet delegation is prepared to accept the examination of one Western proposal only, that concerning the risk of war.

According to the statement we have just heard, the Polish delegation now wishes to add a fourth measure proposed by the delegations of the socialist countries, the proposal concerning denuclearized zones (ENDC/C.1/1). Thus, according to the socialist delegations, the agenda should include three questions proposed by the Eastern delegations and one question proposed by the Western delegations. I must say that this method of procedure does not seem to me to be in conformity with an



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equitable spirit of co-operation. It seems rather to indicate a desire on the part of the Socialist delegations to impose their views and their agenda upon the Committee of the Whole. The Western delegations have shown that they were prepared to renounce their wishes in order to avoid a long debate on procedure in plenary session, since such a debate would certainly not have been understood by world opinion. The peoples expect from us concrete acts, not sterile discussions on methods of work.

However, it seems to me that the Western delegations cannot always and in all cases give way to the Soviet delegation's demands, some of which seem, I must say, to be inspired more by propaganda considerations than by any serious intention to conclude an agreement. In my view we should mainly be guided in our choice of questions for the agenda of the Committee of the Whole by the real possibilities and by the genuine chances which exist or do not exist of concluding an agreement on the problem in hand; for what world opinion chiefly expects of this Committee of the Whole is that it should bring the world immediate relief from fear and anxiety. The hopes of the world would be disappointed if the Committee of the Whole were to plunge into long and futile discussions on subjects concerning which, as we already know, agreement is extremely difficult to obtain.

Therefore to my mind we should first of all choose relatively easy and concrete measures which present a good and encouraging prospect for agreement. It seems to me that, amongst all the collateral measures which have been put forward on all sides, those concerning the risk of war by miscalculation best correspond with this aim. Indeed, on this subject the Western proposals (ENDC/70), at least in part, find a correspondence and a parallel in somewhat similar proposals from the Soviet side which have been formulated within the framework of the Treaty of General and Complete Disarmament (ENDC/2). We should therefore have before us a relatively simple task: comparison of the texts proposed by the United States delegation and by the Soviet delegation, and in due course their integration into a common text.

On the other hand, I cannot say that the measures proposed by the Soviet delegation seem to me at the moment to offer any prospect of the rapid signature

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of an agreement. The Soviet delegation knows the situation very well, and one may well think that, if it insists on a discussion of this proposal, the reason is that it thinks -- to my mind wrongly -- that it can obtain a propaganda advantage, not that it hopes to achieve a concrete result. This, for example, applies to the declaration on so-called foreign bases (ENDC/75). My delegation has already expressed its views on this proposal, and has already stated that it cannot accept it. The discussion of this proposal would not advance our negotiations. It would involve us in wearisome repetitions; since, as is well known, this proposal is completely contrary to the fundamental principles of disarmament, and particularly to the principle of equilibrium.

On the draft non-aggression pact (ENDC/77) my delegation has also expressed its opinion. In principle we are always in favour of any declaration which affirms that there are no aggressive intentions on either side. Our intentions and our desire for peace have been several times reaffirmed by my delegation here and by my Government in Rome.

Since Mr. Tsarapkin has been so kind as to quote my statement (ENDC/PV.109,p concerning the non-aggression pact (ENDC/PV.101,pp.7-8), he will no doubt permit me to repeat that, if the Soviet Union were really convinced that the West was harbouring aggressive intentions, it would not be able to rely simply on the signature of a ~~xxx~~ non-aggression pact. Indeed, this signature could only be a fresh and still more malicious deception, an act of bad faith on our part designed to lull our enemy into a false sense of security and so make an aggressive act easier. The non-aggressive, defensive and pacific character of the Western alliance has been already demonstrated by the facts of history since this alliance came into existence, that is to say during the last fifteen years. For fifteen years, even at times when the military superiority of the Western alliance was absolute, it has aimed only at peace -- at that peace which it urgently desires for the well-being of its peoples and of all the peoples of the world.

However, we are not here to make declarations or to repeat commitments which we have already solemnly undertaken upon our entry into the United Nations. We are here to conclude concrete agreements which will serve as a fresh proof of our desire for peace. Solemn declarations of friendship will be the final and crowning result of these agreements.

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We are involved here in procedural discussions, and I do not wish to enter into the substance of any of the problems at issue. I believe that we must restrict the debate on procedure as far as possible because, as I have just said, world opinion, which is anxious to see our labours end in agreements, would not understand any prolongation of the debate on procedure.

To my mind, given the present state of affairs, we should ask the co-Chairmen to resume their efforts to reach an agreement on procedure for the Committee of the Whole, while taking into account the remarks which have been made here. For my part, I express the sincere wish that such an agreement between the co-Chairmen will be achieved, and that the Committee on collateral measures will be able to resume its work as soon as possible. Personally I have always considered and I still consider this work very urgent and very important, and it would be sad indeed if the Committee of the Whole were once more to be paralysed by the intransigence of a few delegations.

The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I have three more names on my list. The hour is getting late, and perhaps I might be allowed to express the thought that brevity is the soul of wit and the hope that brevity will be generally appreciated. I call upon the representative of the United Kingdom.

Sir Paul MASON (United Kingdom): I think I shall have no difficulty, Mr. Chairman, in conforming with your very wise direction. I can be all the more brief because our colleague from Italy has dealt with a good many of the points which I had intended to raise. I want, however, to speak entirely on the procedural point and, first, to say how very glad the United Kingdom delegation was to note that agreement had been reached between the two co-Chairmen with regard to a procedure (ENDC/PV.108, p.34) for allowing us to resume our discussion on general and complete disarmament. That, as I have had occasion to remark quite recently, is a subject which we in the United Kingdom have always felt should not be allowed to disappear from our discussions, or indeed to be too much overlaid by the urgency of questions such as that of the conclusion of a nuclear test ban agreement.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

We were very glad to hear also that there had been a discussion between the two co-Chairmen on how best to revive the work of the Committee of the Whole. Our hopes were raised when we were informed that in fact it had been possible to agree upon a pair of measures, one from one side and one from the other, which would be the first subjects for discussion at alternate meetings -- or whatever the appropriate procedure would be. I am not going to go into the merits of these questions. One assumes that, on the occasions of such discussions between the two co-Chairmen, each co-Chairman chooses the subject he thinks is of major importance and that eventually an agreement is reached between them on their two respective nominations. What has been disappointing is to hear that that apparent agreement was in process of being blocked by the determination of one of the co-Chairmen to make it conditional upon the reaching of agreement to discuss immediately afterwards a further item. From the practical point of view, I fail to see why it is necessary to do that at this stage. We have a pair which apparently was acceptable, and a pair on which there is a great deal of discussion to be undertaken.

As for the Soviet Union's item, that is, the question of the bases on foreign soil (ENDC/75), I can certainly promise that the United Kingdom will have a great deal to say on that. I think we need not fear that our debates will be entirely wasted on that point. I am sure that the same is true of the contributions that will be made on the Western co-Chairman's item. That being so, why should we spoil everything by this rigid insistence upon adding still further to our list, and adding, as far as one can judge, on a partial, not on an impartial, basis? If the Soviet co-Chairman feels that it is urgently necessary in second place -- not in first place, but in second place -- to discuss the item on the question of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, then his way, as far as I can see, is quite clear. All he has to do is accept a nomination from the Western co-Chairman and let it be agreed that that discussion shall take place, at the appropriate moment, which I suppose would be after the first discussion was concluded. However, I am afraid that, by insisting on discussing this item without any further undertaking about what is to be discussed from the Western side, the Soviet co-Chairman is simply blocking the progress of discussion of his own measure, and I do not understand his purpose in doing that.

(Sir Paul Mason, United Kingdom)

I am not trying to suggest that I am altogether in favour of discussing at this stage the item on the non-aggression pact. If I may, I want to correct what may have been a slight misunderstanding on the part of our colleague from Poland. I understood him to indicate that my leader, Mr. Godber, had said that the United Kingdom was in favour of that item. I think that that impression must not be allowed to stand. What Mr. Godber said (ENDC/FV.100, p.44) was that he recognized that it was a subject for discussion; but he did not say that he was in favour of discussing the item necessarily at this stage. He certainly said nothing to imply that he was in favour of discussion on the basis of the draft text which was circulated some time ago by the Soviet delegation (ENDC/77).

I repeat that I think the most practical way would be for the co-Chairmen to agree, and for us to endorse their agreement, only on the basis of the first pair of measures. If they wish to look still further into the future, then let them agree on another pair, in which case the Western co-Chairman will no doubt have a measure of his own to put forward. If we must look still further, as the representative of Poland has suggested, and have a third pair, then let us in due course arrange for discussion of a third pair; but I think that would be a long time ahead.

Let us not get into an impasse. Let us not allow ourselves to be blocked in our revival of the discussions in the Committee of the Whole by an insistence on going outside our normal procedure and trying to work, in the way that has already been shown, on a basis of partiality. Echoing the remarks of the representative of Italy, I hope very much that we shall be able to induce the two co-Chairmen to work out agreement on this basis, and preferably at this stage to consider only one pair, while each of them may reserve the right to put forward other pairs as and when discussion of the first pair becomes exhausted.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): In discussing the question of what should be the agenda for the Committee of the Whole we should like first of all to make our position clear, as we have done before, on what is the first priority task of this Committee.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

On Friday, 15 March, the representative of Mexico gave us a very impressive list (ENDC/PV.109, pp.14-16) of statements by delegations here to the effect that to obtain agreement on the cessation of nuclear tests was the most important task of this Conference. There is, I think, no disagreement with that. We believe that the Conference must continue to work mainly on that task until the differences are resolved and agreement is reached; although I must say that the statements we have heard this morning do not give us very much hope for any immediate progress. However, we think that we should try also to agree on measures for reducing international tension which could be put into effect before agreement on general and complete disarmament has been achieved; and this task, in our view, should be of second priority.

We regret very much that the collateral-measures Committee has been inactive for such a long time. On looking back one finds it rather hard to understand why the Committee of the Whole has not had a single meeting since 19 July 1962 -- that is, for a period of eight months. When the Committee of the Whole, or collateral-measures Committee, was established the Canadian delegation thought that progress on these measures could be best assured by dealing with them in a separate body, to make a distinction in our working between them and the measures which properly belong to general and complete disarmament; and we are still convinced of that. We feel that when the Eighteen-Nation Committee decided to establish the Committee of the Whole it recognized that the world would welcome agreement on measures collateral to disarmament as evidence that the major Powers were determined to reverse the arms race and accomplish the major task before this Conference.

We, like others, have noted from the statements of the co-Chairmen (ENDC/PV.109, pp.24 et seq., 37 et seq.) that there is a conflict of views on whether or not the Committee of the Whole should take up the question of a non-aggression pact between the NATO and the Warsaw Pact Powers. The Canadian delegation is in agreement with the view just stated by the representative of the United Kingdom that there would seem to be no reason why we should not proceed at once to discuss those two items which the co-Chairmen seem to have agreed could be taken up in parallel: the question of the reduction of the risk of war through accident or miscalculation (ENDC/70), and the draft declaration on the renunciation of use of foreign territories for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75). We feel that the Committee could very well leave until later the selection of additional items to be taken up when those two subjects have been considered.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

In this connexion all of us realize that there are other important items on the list of collateral measures (ENDC/C.I/2) which, if they were agreed upon, would help towards an agreement on general and complete disarmament. For example, the Canadian delegation has on several occasions in this Conference emphasized the importance of an agreement prohibiting the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction in outer space. We have suggested the text (ENDC/17) of a declaration based on similar provisions in the United States and Soviet Union disarmament plans. The world has much more reason to fear now than in 1962 that the nuclear Powers will develop new and more deadly types of weapons and means of delivery, and it is precisely for that reason that the prohibition of orbiting weapons of mass destruction in outer space is an appropriate item for early discussion in the collateral-measures Committee.

In case it is not possible -- although we hope it may be possible -- for the co-Chairmen to agree to discuss in parallel those items which we have mentioned and which they have seemingly agreed upon, we have another suggestion. During the past eight months the co-Chairmen have apparently been unable to find a way out of the procedural impasse which prevented the convening of the collateral-measures Committee. The Canadian delegation regards the institution of the co-Chairmen as one of the main advantages of this Conference. In the past we welcomed the co-operation which developed between them in recommending the programme of work (ENDC/52), and we strongly hope that that institution will recover its previous effectiveness and not simply remain in a state of deadlock. One of the reasons the Conference agreed to this institution of co-Chairmen was the hope that it would facilitate decisions on procedural matters which might otherwise block discussions; and the record of agreement between the co-Chairmen in making procedural recommendations has, we think, been good on the whole. But we must accept the fact that agenda problems do at present block the opportunity for examining collateral measures.

What can we do in the circumstances? We have a responsibility to discuss collateral measures because that subject has been put on our agenda by General Assembly resolution 1767 (XVII) and it follows that in the absence of agreement between the co-Chairmen, it is the duty of this Eighteen-Nation Committee as a whole to re-examine the entire question of the agenda of the collateral-measures Committee. I should like to suggest that, as a first step, we ask the co-Chairmen to issue a new document stating in parallel columns their respective preferences concerning the agenda. The existing statement (ENDC/C.I/2) was issued on

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2 April 1962. That is almost a year ago, and from the brief report we heard from the co-Chairmen last Friday (EADC/PV.109, pp. 25,39), and from the discussion today, it is obvious that that document is out of date. New items have been added. With a new document before us, the members of this Conference would have a clearer understanding than there is now of the present situation of each side.

Next, we think it would be useful for individual members of this Conference, and in particular the non-aligned members, to submit in writing to the co-Chairmen their views and suggestions on the order of priority of the agenda items. So far as the Canadian delegation is concerned, we are not aware of the views of a number of members of this Conference on this question of the collateral-measures Committee agenda. We think it would certainly help the co-Chairmen in their attempt to reach a joint recommendation to know what other members of the Conference want. The subject of collateral measures is the concern of all representatives here, and their views should be heard.

The Canadian delegation would hope that with the assistance of such documents the co-Chairmen would be able to reach agreement. But even if, contrary to our hope and expectation, they could not do so, we should accept the fact that the Conference still has the responsibility of discussing collateral measures. The Canadian delegation holds the view that, even if there is no agreed agenda, the collateral-measures Committee should meet on a regular basis, and members of this Conference should be free to discuss and to explain their views on those measures which they consider to be of paramount interest.

We recognize that that would be a far from ideal situation; it might mean, certainly at the beginning, a rather disorganized debate. Nevertheless we think that arrangement would have distinct advantages and would certainly be better than each side standing on its present position and refusing to agree to any discussion whatever. First, by carrying on a debate in that way we would prevent the collateral-measures Committee and the collateral measures themselves from becoming dead letters. Secondly, I believe that discussion would show what subjects afforded the best prospect of early agreement. As a common interest in particular items emerged in the general course of the discussion the Committee would be able to select those items on which it wished to concentrate.



(Mr. Burns, Canada)

I hope that these suggestions can be taken into consideration not only by the co-Chairmen but by all members of the Committee, and that they may offer a possible way out of the impasse in which we now find ourselves in this matter.

Mr. BLUSZTAJN (Poland) (translation from French): In view of the late hour I shall be very brief. I think that the statements of the Italian and United Kingdom representatives call for a few remarks on my part.

In connexion with the statement of our Italian colleague, Mr. Cavalletti, I believe that a French historian once said that writing history required a great effort of imagination. I must congratulate the Italian representative: he is quite up to this task. He has made a great deal of the wish of the Western Powers to show a spirit of conciliation and compromise. However, when one looks more closely at what he has just said, it seems to me that it adds up to very little. What is the conclusion to be drawn from his statement? Obviously he agrees that we should discuss the problem of preventing war by miscalculation, which in his opinion offers the greatest chance of leading to an agreement. Mr. Cavalletti should note that we too agree that this problem should appear on our agenda. But he does not wish to discuss the question of eliminating strategic nuclear bases, because he believes that this is pure propaganda. Nor does he wish to discuss the Soviet proposal for the conclusion of a non-aggression pact, because he believes that the peaceful intentions of the NATO countries are so evident that they cannot conclude a non-aggression pact with the signatories of the Warsaw Treaty.

So what is the result? It seems that we have only one point remaining on our agenda: the prevention of war by miscalculation. That is the result of the spirit of compromise and conciliation of the Western delegations.

I should now like to make a remark concerning the United Kingdom representative's statement. Certain points in his statement seem to be worthy of note, and I propose to return to them at one of our later meetings after studying his statement in the verbatim record. At the present stage I shall make only the following remark.

The United Kingdom representative reproved me for saying that the head of the United Kingdom delegation, Mr. Godber, had stated that his delegation was prepared

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to discuss the problem of a non-aggression pact in this Committee. That was not what I said. I simply said I believed that the United Kingdom Government was in favour of the conclusion of a non-aggression pact between the States signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty and the countries members of the Warsaw Pact. I was perhaps justified in hoping that this attitude on the United Kingdom Government's part would be reflected in the position taken up by the United Kingdom delegation at Geneva.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In connexion with the discussion that has developed on the question of what should be discussed in the Committee, in particular in the Committee of the Whole, I should like to make the following clarification of the Soviet Union's position.

We now insist on one thing only: that the question of a non-aggression pact be included in the list of items for discussion by the Committee of the Whole; because we do not consider that any technical questions, such as exchange of missions, notification of the movement of forces, and so on, are adequate measures for preventing war from breaking out. If we set ourselves such an aim, as we undoubtedly do, it is essential to examine the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union for achieving this purpose. I have in mind such proposals as the declaration on renunciation by States of the use of foreign bases for stationing strategical means of delivery of nuclear weapons (ENDC/75), the non-aggression pact (ENDC/77), and the question of establishing nuclear-free zones. These questions could, of course, play a very positive role in the achievement of this aim.

The Soviet delegation cannot agree that the discussion of questions put forward by the other side and in the discussion of which the whole world is interested, should be blocked at the will of one of the co-Chairmen or a group of Western Powers. We have officially submitted a proposal for a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Treaty. But now the United States and its allies, the Western Powers, as is clearly seen from the statements made here by the representative of the United Kingdom, Sir Paul Mason, the representative of Italy,

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

Mr. Cavalletti, and the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, want to prevent discussion by the Committee of the draft non-aggression pact submitted by the Soviet Union. We shall resolutely oppose this line taken by the western Powers, and insist that the question of a non-aggression pact be included in the list of questions to be discussed by the Committee of the whole.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I do not know if we are writing history, but at all events the history we are writing is contained in the verbatim records, which can be consulted by anyone.

Concerning my proposal -- perhaps I expressed myself badly -- my notion was the following. We chose at first to discuss in the Committee of the Whole the question of war propaganda because we believed that this was an easy subject which could constitute a first point of agreement. I hope that the same principle will be applied in future: that is to say, that questions will be chosen upon which agreement can be reached fairly easily. To my mind the question of the risk of war is included in this category, since we have before us proposals which are common to both sides.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): It seems to me that there needs to be a slight clarification of the situation. The Soviet representative said that the only thing that his delegation was asking was that the question of a non-aggression pact between the NATO countries and the Warsaw Treaty countries should be placed on the agenda of the Committee of the whole. But that is not what we are discussing. We are discussing the priority of consideration of questions in the Committee of the Whole. Various delegations have proposed different topics from time to time. The topic of the non-aggression pact between NATO countries and Warsaw Treaty countries is not a new proposal, since it appears in the list of questions put forward by members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament for discussion in the Committee of the whole in document EDC/C.1/2 of 2 April 1962, a document with which members of the Committee are familiar. What we are discussing now is the priority which should be given to items put forward by various delegations.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

The Soviet representative certainly cannot say that the Soviet delegation has never objected to giving priority for discussion to an item submitted by the Western delegations. In fact it has never, without strenuous objection and discussion, accepted that an item put forward by the West should be given priority. The Soviet delegation would not accept priority for an item we put forward regarding the cut-off of production of fissionable materials for use in weapons. So far the only item proposed by the West to which the Soviet delegation has agreed to give priority discussion in the Committee of the Whole was one-half -- one-half, I repeat -- of an item we proposed on the reduction of the possibility of war by surprise attack, miscalculation or failure of communications. After long discussion, and with the assistance of several of the non-aligned delegations, the Soviet representatives were finally brought to agree to give priority to one-half of that item, which is the item we are presently proposing as one of the first pair, namely reduction of the possibility of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.

The United States co-Chairman has agreed to the first pair of items for priority discussion, that is, one-half of our item on surprise attack, which now reads: "Reduction of the possibility of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications" (ENDC/C.1/19), and the Soviet-proposed draft declaration (ENDC/75).

We have a tentative agreement on giving priority to that pair of items. Let us get on with the discussion of those two items to which the Soviet delegation has agreed to give priority, and let us not get bogged down because we cannot agree right now on the priority list of all the other items that various delegations have proposed.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The representative of the United States is resorting to purely formal arguments when he says that what we are discussing now is only the priority of consideration of questions on the list of the Committee of the Whole. That is not so. We have already submitted a draft non-aggression pact and that document is in fact before us, yet now when we ask that, after the United States item on measures

(Mr. Tsarapkin, USSR)

for the prevention of war by accident, miscalculation and so on, the Committee proceed immediately to discuss the question of a non-aggression pact, the United States representative refuses to agree to this. Formally, this is a procedural question, but one which has great political significance. It is not a question of whose half-item is included and whose half-item is not. It is not a matter of arithmetic; we cannot weigh up on an apothecary's scale these points and questions. We are faced with a question of fundamental political importance -- whether or not the Committee binds itself by a decision that we proceed to the discussion of the non-aggression pact.

The United States representative, with the support of the representatives of other Western Powers, does not want the Committee to assume an obligation to consider the draft non-aggression pact. But we insist on it. That is the crux of the matter. And that is why Mr. Stelle misrepresents the situation when he says that we are discussing the priority of consideration of questions. We have submitted our draft non-aggression pact; the United States has submitted nothing on this subject. That is true; but that fact -- namely, that the United States has no enthusiasm for a non-aggression pact -- does not at all mean that we should not discuss this question. We have submitted our draft non-aggression pact and insist that it be discussed as soon as possible. Let us begin with the declaration, the draft of which has been submitted by the Soviet Union, then take up the United States item on measures for preventing war by accident, and then the question of a non-aggression pact. We insist upon it, and shall continue to insist upon it.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I hope that in the light of the remarks which have just been made the two co-Chairmen will meet again and will try to make another effort to reach an agreement on the agenda of the Committee of the Whole.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): At our last meeting we decided to postpone questions of procedure. We intended to discuss these questions of procedure today. It is too late now, and that is why we have decided not to do so.

(Mr. Tarabanov, Bulgaria)

However, we think that it is right and proper that the other delegations which have not yet expressed their views should have the opportunity of doing so at the next meeting or at a later meeting. I do not believe -- and that is why I have asked to speak -- that the statement just made by the Italian representative should signify that the discussion on the question of procedure is closed. The co-Chairmen must have an opportunity of hearing all the discussions which take place here on procedure; and then they can give due consideration to the suggestions and remarks which have been put forward.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I entirely agree with the Bulgarian representative. However, that does not mean that the two co-Chairmen should not in the meantime make a fresh effort to find a basis for agreement.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its one hundred and tenth plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Lij Mikael Imru, representative of Ethiopia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Bulgaria, Nigeria, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, Poland, the United Kingdom and Canada.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 20 March 1963, at 10,30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.